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Summary
In the past two decades, Croatian political institutions have been through a 
whirlwind of change, from wartime politics, to international isolation, to gra-
dual democratization and, most recently, to pending European Union mem-
bership. This paper examines the trends in the development of political cul-
ture over this twenty-year period, drawing an important distinction between 
democratic institution building and liberalization. At the core of the paper are 
the following questions: to what extent can changing political culture explain 
institutional change (and vice versa)? Is political culture determined by, and 
perhaps held prisoner to, history or is it easily mutable? Drawing from the 
Croatian experience, in which history alone is no forecast, the paper will con-
clude by attempting to draw lessons for other countries seeking to democra-
tize their political culture.
Keywords: political culture, Croatia, Southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, demo-
cratization, political transition, post-communist politics, self-expression values
I mixed with people who lived by their pen who described history 
without interfering with politics, as well as with politicians who we-
re engaged solely in creating events without any intention of de-
scribing them. It always struck me that the former would see general 
causes in everything while the latter, living in an entanglement of 
day to day facts, tended to imagine that everything was caused by 
minor incidents, and that the world moves thanks to small wheels 
similar to those that their hands are pushing. I believe that both of 
them are mistaken.
Alexis De Tocqueville, 
Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848
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In the 1970s and 1980s, when authoritarian governments gave way to cautious 
democracies in South America and Southern Europe, academics spoke of ‘move-
ment away from authoritarianism’. Amongst them were Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Philippe Schmitter, the title of whose book is representative of the hesitant tone of 
contemporary scholarship: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclu-
sions about Uncertain Democracies. While the starting point of these transitional 
countries was clear, the direction of their transition was marked by a sense of am-
biguity. 
With the collapse of communism and the Berlin Wall, politicians and acade-
mics alike were imbued with a sense of optimism about where the world was head-
ed as it stood on the brink of the 21st century. With communism discredited and the 
United States the only superpower left standing, democracy seemed the only re-
maining credible system of government. As Fukuyama famously says, “the triumph 
of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of vi-
able systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” (Fukuyama, 1989). Academics 
proclaimed the new transitional countries to be in the process of ‘democratization’, 
and enthusiastically debated the merits of different methods of privatization and li-
beralization. Grants from the West poured into the former Eastern bloc to fund civil 
society initiatives, advisors from top banks arrived to oversee the process of priva-
tization, foreign aid and foreign investment surged.1
Yet despite initial external and internal enthusiasm regarding the so-called 4th 
wave of democracy, many countries stalled or reversed in their supposed democrati-
zation process as authorities regained the control they had lost in the first half of the 
1990s, as in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Belarus, Turkmenistan (Way, 
2005). While the European Union has extended membership to ten former Eastern 
bloc countries,2 Romania and Bulgaria’s ongoing struggles with corruption and 
organized crime were cause for many to judge the membership as premature. The 
Color Revolutions at the turn of the 21st century gave some new enthusiasm to the 
democratization hopefuls, but even there significant work remains.3 The varying 
1 For more see Youngs, 2004.
2 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia en-
tered the EU in 2004. Cyprus and Malta also joined at the same time. Romania and Bulgaria fol-
lowed 3 years later in 2007. 
3 Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan’s 
Tulip Revolution. Some might argue to include the cases of Romania in 1996, Slovakia in 1998, 
and Serbia in 2000. Yet with the electoral model that characterized the Color Revolutions, the 
focus was foremost on defending the integrity of electoral results and did not necessarily imply 
a commitment to democracy in a broader sense. Although the opposition parties of Georgia, 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan banded together to provide an alternative to the incumbent in each case, 
these alliances often proved ineffective and unsustainable when it came to policy and reforms.
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experiences of these 23 post-communist nations in the past two decades have forced 
academics to re-confront some basic questions regarding the nature of democracy: 
can democratic values take root anywhere or are some cultural legacies adverse to 
democratic values? By what criteria does one measure democracy? The answer to 
this question had and has serious implications for the standards transitional nations 
are held to as they try to join the democracy club of NATO and the EU.
Democracy being a difficult thing to quantify, the US government chose to fo-
cus its attention on one of the few elements of democracy that can be objectively 
measured: the conduction of free and fair elections. Yet, while important, this dis-
proportionate focus on elections as the defining element of democracy had some-
thing of a negative effect on the transition processes of post-communist Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe. Once a set of national elections had been completed, the 
democratic transition was assessed to be complete and international attention and 
funding moved elsewhere. Rather than treating democracy as a continuum within 
which it is possible to have varying levels of democracy, free and fair elections, as 
certified by such organizations as Freedom House and the Organization For Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were seen as crossing the symbolic finish 
line towards democracy.
What the Western democracy advisors failed to devote adequate attention to 
– perhaps because of its intangible, difficult to quantify nature – was “the impor-
tance for democratic consolidation of a civic culture – Tocqueville summed it up 
as the ‘habits of the heart’ – without which the legitimacy and stability of demo-
cratic institutions will always remain doubtful” (Rubnik, 2007: 19). An increasing 
number of values-based surveys in post-communist countries and the resulting data 
has enabled political scientists to more effectively measure and distinguish between 
electoral democracy which “hinges on suffrage and considers any regime that holds 
competitive, free, fair, and regular elections to be a democracy” (Welzel and Ingle-
hart, 2008: 126) and liberal democracy which is “based on mass voice in self-go-
vernance [and] therefore depends on social preconditions such as the wide distribu-
tion of participatory resources and a trusting, tolerant public that prizes free choice” 
(ibid.). This trend towards a more well-rounded view of democracy is based on the 
conception of democracy founded, not on public balloting, but on public reasoning 
(Sen, 2003). 
In staying with this more expansive view of democracy, the aim of this paper is 
to examine the evolution of political culture during democratization. Based on data 
gathered by the World Value Surveys, Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart assess 
the following so-called self-expression values to be essential social preconditions 
for liberal democracy: tolerance, high levels of interpersonal trust, and participatory 
habits (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 129). These values, they conclude, are a much 
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better indicator of societal commitment to democracy than is the percentage of the 
population who verbally endorse democracy, as they shed light on the priority given 
to “freedom and autonomy as goods in and of themselves” (ibid.: 132). Therefore, 
measurements of political culture presented here will focus on these three values. 
It is worth noting that the three self-expression habits examined here are by no 
means an all-inclusive list. Political scientists have generated a virtually limitless 
list of habits of the heart thought to cultivate democratic proficiency in a citizen-
ry, ranging from ability for critical thinking, patriotism, social consciousness and 
global awareness to public spiritedness. Yet in the effort to sift through the unend-
ing lists of proposed qualities characterizing a democratically component citizenry, 
Robert Weissberg stresses that “the emphasis [should be] on essential traits, not 
everything conceivably augmenting democracy” (Weissberg, 2001: 261), on those 
consistent across time and place. Looking at data spanning 30 years, over 80 coun-
tries and nearly 90 percent of the world’s population, Welzel and Inglehart are in a 
prime position to identify these essential traits. It is for this reason that I have cho-
sen to focus on the three values discussed above, while acknowledging that other 
values outside the scope of this paper can positively impact the democratic compe-
tence of a citizenry.
The central questions that this paper hopes to address are as follows: 1) Get-
ting at the compatibility of non-Western cultures with democratic values, to what 
extent is current political culture a product of historical political culture? More sim-
ply, how much does history matter in shaping political culture? 2) What, if any, is 
the correlation between the democratization of institutions and the liberalization of 
political culture? Or in other words, does electoral democracy lead to liberal demo-
cracy or do the underlying preconditions of each develop independently?
In order to make these questions more concrete, I will examine them through 
the lens of developments in Croatia’s political culture from 1991 to 2011. Croatia 
is an appropriate case study because it underwent an enormous amount of institu-
tional change in this 20-year time period – from ethnic war, to international isola-
tion under a nationalist leader, to standing on the brink of becoming the EU’s 28th 
member – allowing us to test the correlation between the democratization of institu-
tions and the liberalization of political culture. Furthermore, like most transitional 
nations, Croatia entered its independence with a political culture shaped by its past; 
the endurance of the Yugoslav legacy on Croatian political culture will shed light 
on the potential of countries lacking a democratic history to develop a political cul-
ture necessary to sustaining democracy, either by shedding or adapting their unique 
legacies.
The paper is organized as follows. The first two sections focus on the role of 
historical legacy in shaping political culture. Part 1 provides a broad overview of 
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the various historical legacies at work by placing Croatia in a geographical and his-
torical context with regards to its relation to Europe and to the Balkans. Part 2 nar-
rows in on the historical legacy of the Yugoslav era on political culture in order to 
achieve a better understanding of the political culture with which Croatia entered its 
independence in 1991. Part 3 utilizes existing values-based surveys to identify de-
velopments within Croatian political culture from 1991 to 2011. Section 4 focuses 
on the correlation between institutional democratization and the liberalization of 
political culture, contrasting levels of institutional democracy with the democratic 
(and nondemocratic) elements of political culture in order to assess the degree of 
convergence. It also examines other possible driving forces behind changes in po-
litical culture. Part 5 places the observations regarding the development of Croatian 
political culture during democratic transition into a broader regional and global con-
text. Part 6 provides a conclusion.
Part 1: Placing Croatia in a Geographical and Historical Context
Both geographically and historically, Croatia has one foot in Europe and one in the 
Balkans. It is neither wholly a part of Western Europe, as is the case with core EU 
members such as France and Germany, nor is it wholly a Balkans country, such as 
Serbia. 
Croatia’s self identification as part of the West can be traced to its membership 
in the Austrian empire (1527-1918). As the meeting ground for the Ottoman and 
Austrian Empires, Croats were supremely aware of the contrast between themselves 
and the great other, the Turks. Thus, it came to be that Croatia has a very different 
conception of itself, as well as a different set of underlying historical legacies, than 
its southern neighbors it would come to be united with in the 20th century. Yet de-
spite its historical grouping with the West, the role of democracy and liberalism in 
Croatia, the very ideas that define the modern day conception of the West, differed 
notably in timing from its Western neighbors.
In 1848, while most of Europe was revolting against monarchs, empires and 
divine right, opting instead for democracy and liberty, Croatia actually reasserted its 
loyalty to the Austrian crown. The 1848 Sabor professed this loyalty (along with its 
hopes for a greater status for Croatia within the Empire that would go unfulfilled) 
saying, “let Hungary separate from the Habsburg Monarchy and consequently from 
these kingdoms, if it has the inclination and the strength; but Croatia, Slavonia and 
Dalmatia are independent countries, and as such they not only do not wish to loosen 
the existing bond with Austria, but rather declare openly and unreservedly that they 
desire to enter into a still closer connection with the now constitutional Empire of 
Austria, on the basis of complete equality of all nations” (Memories of a Ban ex-
hibit, 2010).
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The consequences of this were far reaching for Croatia, albeit in a very different 
manner than for the rest of Europe. For most of Europe, the year of failed revolutions 
was their first (albeit short-lived) experience with a modern, liberal government. De-
spite the resurrection of monarchy, liberals would point to 1848 as the golden period, 
using it as a historical precedent to call for the resurrection of the 1848 constitution 
and laws in their respective countries. Croatia had no such legal historical legacy to 
call upon. Lacking this precedent, Croatia’s political goals for the remainder of the 
19th century focused on the gradual establishment of a modern government, aims of 
increased Croatian autonomy, territorial integrity (unification with Dalmatia and the 
Military Border), and promotion of Croatian culture and language. Operating under 
the perception that its status within Western Europe depended on its successful re-
plication of Western institutions, Croatia largely succeeded in modernizing its legal 
and judicial systems during the second half of the 19th century. However, despite 
movements towards liberalization, the state did not democratize. To the contrary, 
reformers actively resisted movement towards democratization, rejecting a proposal 
in 1875 to extend the franchise to lower social classes and curtailing the use of jury 
courts (Čepulo, 2006). As a whole, experimentation with democratic principles such 
as individual rights and freedoms remained severely limited, perhaps out of prac-
ticality (all Croatian laws required the approval of the emperor) or perhaps out of 
the perception that achievement of national autonomy took priority over individual 
autonomy. Regardless of the cause, Croatia entered the 20th century lacking any sig-
nificant historical experimentation with democracy.
The interlinkages between the processes of industrialization, urbanization and 
democratization are many. Rising urbanization rates are, of course, indicative of 
industrialization. Industrialization produces a middle class that historically play a 
key role in demands for democracy as their new wealth gives them a vested interest 
in increased representation for those outside of the traditionally privileged classes. 
Yet at the turn of the 20th century, the effects of the industrial revolution had not yet 
fully reached Croatia:4 in 1931, a full 76.4 percent of the population still worked in 
agriculture (Flere, 1991: 185). In contrast, in 1901 the urban population of England 
and Wales was 72%, of Germany and the Netherlands roughly 50%, and of France, 
Switzerland and Belgium roughly 40% (Gannet, 1901: 266). Croatia’s delayed ur-
banization (population growth in the capital city of Zagreb was slow until the 20th 
century),5 had additional political implications, as geographical proximity tradition-
ally facilitates political organization. 
4 Given that Croatia was still split between several administrative districts of the Austrian-Hun-
garian Empire, figures for this period are scant.
5 The population growth of Zagreb was as follows: 1801 – 6586 people, 1850 – estimated 15,000 
people, 1900 – estimated 61,000 people, 1921 – 108,674 people, 1931 – estimated 185,000 
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Although Western Europe only grew to be synonymous with the doctrines of 
democracy and liberalism in the 20th century, the grounds for that distinction were 
laid well before that, in the 19th and even the 18th centuries. It was then that Croatia’s 
divergence from the European path began, and it is for these reasons that, histori-
cally speaking, Croatia cannot be accurately classified entirely as part of Western 
Europe.
The year 1918 marks the date when Croatian history broke from its previous 
association with Europe and became linked with the Balkans, a linkage that for-
mally continued up through its succession from Yugoslavia in 1991. The Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, formed in the aftermath of the First World War, in-
cluded the previously independent territories of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as 
the formerly Austrian-Hungarian controlled territories of Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavo-
nia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908), and 
Vojvodina (Milojević, 1925: 70). An estimated 40.1% of the population were Serb, 
while 23.3% were Croat, and 8.5% Slovene (Jovic, 2003). Surrounded by the terri-
torial ambitions of Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, Croats idealistically assumed their 
future lay in union with their fellow Southern Slavs. However, despite the enthusi-
astic rhetoric about a brotherhood of the Southern Slavs, no state had ever before 
joined these peoples under a single government. 
Little thought was given to the compatibility of imperial legacies or cultures. 
From the 15th-18th centuries, Serbia had been a part of the Ottoman Empire before 
becoming an autonomous principality in 1817 and receiving formal independence 
in 1878. In contrast to the Austrian tradition of local government, the Serbian state 
was based on the “orthodox, unitary and centralistic constitutional institutions of 
the French administrative system” (Newman, 1970: 172). From the very beginning 
of their union, it was the clash of these two imperial legacies that impeded the es-
tablishment of a Southern Slav state, with Croats resenting the heavy centralization 
in Belgrade and the lack of Croatian autonomy. The separateness felt between the 
three component ethnicities was evident in the name of the state, emphasizing the 
three main component groups individually rather than their unity. The central chal-
lenge of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later inherited by the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) lay in reconciling the “cultural dualism” of Serbia 
and Croatia, with their foundations in the East and West respectively. 
The historical differences predating the 20th century between Croatia and the 
rest of the Balkans are not confined to political institutions. Throughout Yugoslav 
history, the divergence of cultural traditions (in which religion plays a defining part) 
people, 1948 – estimated 279,000 people, 1953 – estimated 350,000 people, 1971 – estimated 
602,000 people, 1981 – estimated 768,700 people, 1991 – 933,914 people.
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proved stronger than the shared ethnic heritage. In the 1920s, the political institutions 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were largely dominated by Serbs, 
which, “for a Roman Catholic people on the periphery of civilized Europe, ... signi-
fied submission to an inferior, Oriental culture” (Doder, 1993: 10). In a scenario remi-
niscent of an immigrant who identifies more strongly with his homeland when he is 
outside of it, Croats actually came to identify more strongly with their European his-
tory upon entering into the Yugoslav phase of their history. Even when cultural simi-
larities existed, as with language, the component ethnicities actively sought to dis-
tinguish their identity: in 1967, Croatian academics and cultural organizations issued 
the ‘Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of Croatian Standard Language’, 
objecting to the classification of their language as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian, 
and calling for the recognition of Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian as 
separate and equal languages (Goldstein, 1999: 176). 
Additionally, while Croatia had been amongst the least industrialized countries 
of Europe, its position within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was quite 
different. Despite being a primarily peasant nation, Croatia was still economically 
and industrially ahead of its Southern neighbors. Zagreb was “the last point of capi-
talistic exploitation in Europe; everything further to the east [was] Balkan, in other 
words, Orient” (Fisher, 1963: 277). The North/South economic divide, with Croatia 
and Slovenia being the wealthiest Yugoslav republics, would persist throughout the 
20th century and cause much tension.
Croatia’s 20th century history is closely tied to that of its Balkans neighbors, 
yet its Western foundations as part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire simultane-
ously mark it as unique in the Balkans. The description of Southeastern Europe as 
the place where “the tectonic places of imperial, religious and racial interest have 
ground together” (Doder, 1993: 5) is an apt one. Though Croatia today has attempt-
ed to look past its Yugoslav history and rebrand itself as a Western country, when 
viewed through a historical lens, Croatia is a love child of the East and West with a 
corresponding complexity of historical legacies.
Part 2: Yugoslav Legacy on Political Culture
To get a complete picture of Croatia’s political culture entering 1991, we would ide-
ally assess the unique impact of each phase of its history. Still, since the line must 
be drawn somewhere, we will confine our focus to the legacy of Croatia’s Yugoslav 
period on its political culture, specifically on the self-expression values that form 
the center of our study: participatory habits, tolerance and interpersonal trust. In 
order to do so, we must first establish a firmer understanding of the conditions in 
which these values develop and to what extent Yugoslavia provided germane condi-
tions for their development. 
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Welzel and Inglehart identify a strong linkage between self-expression values 
and economic development. Their reasoning is as follows: as one’s economic se-
curity increases, one’s priorities move away from ‘survival values’ to put greater 
importance on personal freedoms. Thus, they stress that self-expression values can 
develop under any regime with a certain level of economic development, while ad-
mitting that “economic development alone does not bring democracy. It does so 
only in combination with certain cultural factors. But these factors are not necessa-
rily unique to certain European countries and the lands that they colonized” (Welzel 
and Inglehart, 2008: 137). 
According to their thesis, we would expect that, as Croatia’s economy deve-
lops, so too would the frequency and strength of self-expression values regardless 
of the regime type. Thus, given the more advanced state of the Croatian (and Slo-
venian) economy in the 20th century as compared to the other Yugoslav republics, 
we would expect to see a stronger showing of self-expression values in Croatia. 
While the economic element will be addressed in greater detail in Part 5, the re-
mainder of this section will be devoted to analyzing the cultural factors that Welzel 
and Inglehart mention. In examining these cultural factors, we are somewhat hin-
dered by the fact that statistics for the Yugoslav era often consider the country as a 
whole without breaking down data by individual republic. Out of necessity, the ma-
jority of our observations about the political culture of the Yugoslav era will apply 
to Yugoslavia as a whole, though we will supplement this with specific references 
to Croatia whenever possible.
It is an oft-heard refrain that by denying citizens of political choice, commu-
nism stifled participatory habits, producing politically apathetic populations. Ac-
cording to the subscribers of this theory, the popular uprisings of 1989 and 1990 
were a blip in the radar, after which the populations fell back into a state of political 
apathy. Although this may have been the case under Soviet regimes (and even there, 
strong arguments and examples to the contrary exist), the Yugoslav system of com-
munism certainly defies this generalization.
Following their break from the USSR in 1948, Yugoslav socialists sought a 
way to distinguish their form of socialism from that of Moscow. What emerged was 
the concept of economic self-management, described by one author as a system of 
‘economic alchemy’ (Doder, 1978: 90). Although the practical application of the 
system never lived up to the theory, self-management aimed to produce a highly de-
centralized economy, in contrast to the central planning Soviet Gosplan, that placed 
decision-making powers directly in the hands of the workers. In the absence of tra-
ditional Western participatory outlets, citizens could be elected to workers’ coun-
cils, local community councils, apartment/house councils, and municipal councils. 
Far from condemning the Yugoslav system for denying citizens of participatory 
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venues, Western academics Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim praised 
Yugoslavia for being “in the forefront in the innovation of new modes of political 
activity” (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 219) in their study comparing participatory 
behavior of seven nations, six of which were capitalist. 
In theory, economic self-management “introduced elements of civil and eco-
nomic responsibility” (Doder, 1978: 89) into the system, giving ordinary citizens 
a voice in their workplaces and local communities. Of Verba, Nie and Kim’s 2,995 
survey participants, 20% had served in workers’ councils, 7% in local community 
councils, 6% in apartment/house councils, and 4% in municipal councils (Verba, 
Nie and Kim, 1978: 60). Membership to these councils implied an ongoing com-
mitment, as opposed to the one-time job of showing up to the polls. It would also 
seem likely that the cooperative nature of the councils would engender interperso-
nal trust. Writing in 1965, after the issuance of a new federal constitution furthering 
economic self-management, Serbian political economist Ivan Maksimović optimis-
tically predicted a “democratization of economic life followed by democratization 
of political life” (Maksimović, 1965: 16). 
Yet despite Yugoslavia’s socialist rhetoric, the effects of self-management on 
participatory habits do not appear to have been spread equally across all sectors of 
society. Verba, Nie and Kim’s data, gathered 1970-1971, revealed a stark socio-eco-
nomic divide in predicting participatory behavior, higher even than in the Western 
cases of the study. Rating participants on a socio-economic resource level (SERL) 
scale of low, medium and high that incorporates the level of income and education, 
Verba, Nie and Kim found a “strong positive relationship between SERL and party 
affiliation”, where only 3% in the ‘low’ SERL group were members to the League 
of Communists, compared to 30% of the ‘high’ SERL group (Verba, Nie and Kim, 
1978: 220). The composition of the League reflects this imbalance: though the 
League had emerged from WWII as a grass-roots organization with a full 50% of its 
membership originating in the peasantry, by 1968 peasants made up only 7% of its 
membership (ibid.: 223). Restrictive criteria for membership to the League of Com-
munists further limited political participation of the common Yugoslav. Although 
the government in Belgrade did not enforce atheism on the population as a whole, 
it remained a requirement for League membership. In a system where “affiliation is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for high levels of regular political activi-
ty” (ibid.: 87), the correlation between socio-economic status and party affiliation is 
highly significant when considering the distribution of participatory habits in soci-
ety (ibid.). In the categories of regular political activity, voting, functional self-ma-
nagement, and psychological involvement, members of the Socialist Alliance and 
League of Communists were consistently shown to participate at greater rates than 
those in the unaffiliated group. Furthermore, in nearly all cases, levels of participa-
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tion within an affiliations group are correlated to SERL: of the unaffiliated, partici-
pation levels are lowest in the ‘low’ SERL group and highest in the ‘high’ SERL 
group. The same holds true for those belonging to the Socialist Alliance and League 
of Communists (ibid.). Thus, while the unique self-management structure of the Yu-
goslav system provided outlets for political participation, and in so doing cultivated 
participatory habits often considered exclusive to multiparty systems, these were 
conferred disproportionately upon those of higher socio-economic status.
What then of those in the low SERL group not represented in the councils? 
Did they develop habits outside of the government-provided outlets? The largest 
incident of public protest under Tito was the so-called Croatian Spring of 1971, 
in which economic grievances were expressed through nationalistic rhetoric. The 
message resonated with the public: 30,000 Croatian university students expressed 
their support through a strike. Though it would be easy to read Croatian Spring as 
evidence of latent participatory habits in the population, the events of 1971 appear 
to be more of an exception than a trend for the period. The fledging opposition was 
effectively muted for the better part of the next two decades following Belgrade’s 
heavy-handed response: the Croatian communist party was purged of those with 
nationalist tendencies, student leaders were imprisoned, and the cultural organiza-
tion Matica Hrvatska was abolished (Batović, 2009: 18). Though the event shows 
a one-time willingness to rally behind a large popular movement, it would be an 
exaggeration to call a one-time event a habit.
As a whole, the impact of the Yugoslav system on participatory habits was 
something of a mixed legacy. The system featured a variety of unique participa-
tory mechanisms, many of which were characterized by ongoing, habitual partici-
pation as opposed to the one-time act of voting. Yet criteria for membership to the 
League of Communists, as well as an inherent bias of the system towards individu-
als of higher economic status, cultivated participatory habits disproportionately in 
the wealthier, higher educated, and less culturally traditional part of society. Mo-
dernization may have produced a desire for participation amongst the lower classes, 
as we will discuss further in Part 4, but actual participatory opportunities and thus 
habits were largely confined to those of higher socio-economic status.
The Yugoslav state was unique in the communist world for its degree of intel-
lectual freedom and global openness, providing the average Yugoslav citizen with 
a great deal of interaction with the non-communist world. Yugoslavs had the free-
dom to travel, a freedom which many took advantage of to obtain jobs in the West 
and send money back home, so that in 1980, $4,050 million poured into Yugosla-
via in the form of remittances (Migrant Workers’ Remittances, 1984: 536). Foreign 
tourists – peaking at 67,665,000 tourist nights per year in 1985 (Goldstein, 1999: 
191) – cycled through Croatia’s Dalmatian coast, providing locals with direct expo-
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sure to the Western world. In 1964, Yugoslavia became the only communist coun-
try to sign the Fulbright agreement with the United States. Every year thereafter, 
30-some Yugoslav students, professors and researchers would spend a year in the 
United States, while an equal number of Americans conducted academic research 
and taught in Yugoslavia (Peck, 1987: 10). While the media operated under some 
political censorship, Yugoslavia imported American books, magazines and records 
under the US Informational Media Guarantee Program and translated a number of 
foreign titles into local languages (1,666 in 1967), which indicates that “the right to 
read, and hence the right to know, [was] a concept accepted by Yugoslavs” (Booher, 
1975: 129). All Yugoslav students studied a mandatory 4 years of foreign language 
(English, French, German, Italian or Russian) during grades 5-8, and most univer-
sity departments required students to complete 2 years of a foreign language (the 
above-mentioned with the additions of Latin and Greek) (Bancroft, 1974: 104). Al-
though value-based survey data does not exist for this era, it seems reasonable to ex-
pect that these various venues of contact with the non-Yugoslav world would have 
broadened the Yugoslavs’ worldview and produced a relatively tolerant society.
Indeed, the very design of the Yugoslav state was intended to supersede eth-
nic rivalries and to cultivate ethnic tolerance. Though the multilingual, multieth-
nic, multi-faith nature of Yugoslavia ultimately proved the fault lines upon which 
it would crack, did the increased interaction lead to an increase in tolerance and in-
terpersonal trust? Where interaction did occur, researchers Randy Hodson, Dusko 
Sekulic and Garth Massey found a consequent increase in tolerance. Using data 
collected 1989-1990, immediately before the outbreak of war, Hodson, Sekulic and 
Massey found a direct correlation between levels of diversity and levels of tolerance 
on a republic basis. Survey participants were asked the extent to which they agreed 
or disagreed, on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 questions regarding different nationalities. 
Bosnia – the most diverse of the republics – had the highest average tolerance score 
of 3.88, while the province of Kosovo – the least diverse part of Yugoslavia – had 
the lowest score of 1.71. The greatest limitation of this data, of course, is that it 
cannot be compared to levels of tolerance outside of Yugoslavia. What we can as-
sess from this data, however, is that Croatia was one of the more tolerant republics 
in Yugoslavia, coming in just behind Bosnia and Vojvodina with a score of 3.63. 
Hodson, Sekulic and Massey further found that the majority group within a repub-
lic was less tolerant than a minority group in the republic. In other words, Croats in 
Croatia were less tolerant (3.60) than Serbs in Croatia (3.93) (Hodson, Sekulic and 
Massey, 1994).
Still, the fact remains that the interaction credited with producing tolerance 
was limited throughout much of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav republics, with the ex-
ception of Bosnia, were predominately populated by the ethnic group for which 
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they were named.6 A study of internal migration based off of data from the 1961 
census found that, though migration was common, migration between republics 
was relatively rare. In the 1961 census, 32.7% of the population within Croatia 
had migrated to their current location from elsewhere in Croatia. Only 5.9% of the 
population had migrated to their current location from outside of Croatia (Hawry-
lyshyn, 1977: 101). Although the author acknowledges that other factors, such as 
distance and cost, could discourage inter-republic migration, the data certainly calls 
into question the extent to which interaction produced interethnic tolerance.
The data on interethnic marriage also fails to convincingly support the thesis 
of increasing interethnic tolerance. Contrary to League claims that high levels of 
interethnic marriage were indicative of social integration, Nikolai Botev found that, 
from 1962 to 1989, rates of intermarriage in Yugoslavia remained between 12 and 
13 percent (Botev, 1994: 469).7 Botev notes that not only is this figure unchanging, 
but also relatively low for an ethnically mixed society; in 1980, over 20% of mar-
riages in the US were ethnically mixed, while in the late 1970s, that figure stood at 
over 30% in Canada (Botev, 1994: 468). 
This brings us to the manner in which Yugoslavia broke apart: through vio-
lent, nationalist war characterized by incidents of ethnic cleansing. At a precurso-
ry glance, this may appear the most compelling proof for a legacy of intolerance. 
Around the same time that Hodson, Sekulic and Massey were measuring tole-
rance levels within Yugoslavia, a survey of secondary school children found that 
“Croatian children described their own group as proud, democratic, and peace-
-loving, but perceived Serbs as domineering, antagonistic toward others, aggres-
sive, and perfidious. Serbian students saw themselves as proud, hospitable, brave 
and lively, but viewed Croats as perfidious, antagonistic toward others, conceited, 
chauvinistic, and envious” (Cohen, 1993: 258). If one evaluates Croatia’s Yugoslav 
history only on the basis of how it ended, intolerance seems to be, uncontestedly, 
the most powerful force. But even acknowledging that interaction and thus tole-
rance had been limited in Yugoslavia, how do we explain the outbreak of war in 
two of what Hodson, Sekulic and Massey found to be the most tolerant republics, 
Croatia and Bosnia? The three authors attempt to explain this contradiction by say-
ing that the conditions facilitating tolerance simultaneously “create the potential 
for heightened intergroup competition and conflict over scarce economic and po-
litical resources (...) Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav 
6 According to the 1981 census, Croatia was 75.1% Croat, Macedonia was 67.0% Macedonian, 
Montenegro was 68.5% Montenegrin, Slovenia was 90.5% Slovene, and Serbia was 66.4% Serb. 
Bosnia was the exception with 18.4% Croat, 32.0% Serb, and 39.5% Muslim.
7 Admittedly, the percentage of intermarriages in Croatia, between 15 and 17 percent, was con-
sistently higher than the Yugoslav average.
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republic, but this increased tolerance proved insufficient to outweigh the political 
forces emanating from its extremely diverse social fabric” (Hodson, Sekulic and 
Massey, 1994: 1555). According to this explanation, intolerance was not the cause 
of the conflict, but rather a result. In this portrayal, tolerance is something of a fair 
weather value, an assessment supported by the assertion that preexisting tolerance 
can be undermined by a perceived threat. “In the absence of a strong threat, belief in 
abstract norms will constrain responses to specific instances in which citizens’ tole-
rance is tested. If the threat is strong enough, however, it will override these abstract 
beliefs” (Shamir and Sullivan, 1983: 916).
To briefly address the final self-expression value, that of interpersonal trust, we 
ask the question: is an intolerant society necessarily a distrusting one? In the case of 
Yugoslavia, many narratives exist of Croats proclaiming distrust of Serbs (as in the 
survey of school children recounted above), but harboring no such sentiments to-
ward their next door neighbor who happened to be a Serb (and of Serbs speaking of 
Croats). This seeming paradox can be partly explained by drawing a distinction be-
tween interpersonal trust and trust of a group. The distrust of an entire ethnic group 
is, of course, potentially dangerous in that it can be easily manipulated and mobi-
lized by war-mongering, nationalist politicians which existed in no small quantity 
at the time of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. But this type of distrust, while certainly not 
a desirable trait, does not hamper the development of a democratic citizenry in the 
same way that an absence of interpersonal trust would. While the two are certainly 
interrelated, it is this quality we are most interested in.
Croatia certainly did not enter its post-Yugoslav period with the robust political 
culture featuring widespread participatory habits and high levels of tolerance and 
interpersonal trust that underlie a liberal democracy. And yet, Yugoslavia had not 
actively obstructed the development of these values, and in some cases had actively 
worked to promote them. True, the distribution of participatory habits was unevenly 
skewed in favor of those of higher socio-economic status. But the socialist message 
of self-management and the limited experience of the populace with participatory 
outlets had at least left a legacy of active citizenship. Tolerance in Bosnia, Vojvo-
dina and Croatia was higher than in other parts of the federation, but the outbreak 
of war in Croatia and Bosnia is evidence of the vulnerability of tolerance. It is upon 
this legacy that Croatia entered its independence in 1991.
Part 3: Developments in Croatian Political Culture 1991-2010
Were this legacy to prove difficult to overcome, we would expect to see little change 
in the political culture of post-Yugoslav Croatia. This would obstruct the develop-
ment of liberal democracy in Croatia, restraining it to, at best, electoral democracy. 
On the other hand, if political culture can be easily relearned, we would expect to 
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see Croatia gradually exchange its Yugoslav political culture for one featuring the 
self-expression values that are conducive to liberal democracy. To assess the deve-
lopment of the self-expression values of transitional Croatia we will make use of the 
World Values (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). Croatia was included 
in the 1995 wave of WVS (N=1196) and the 1999 (N=1003) and 2008 (N=1525) 
waves of EVS. When possible, we will supplement these with findings from sur-
veys conducted by local organizations.
To operationalize tolerance, we will use the data collected from the series of 
questions regarding neighbor preferences. WVS and EVS survey participants were 
given a list of groups and asked which “would you not like to have as neighbors?” 
Admittedly, some of the provided groups (people with a criminal record, left or 
right wing extremists) may not reflect intolerance so much as concerns for the safe-
ty of one’s family. Here we present only the groups that would speak to degree of 
tolerance.
Table A.
WVS 1995 EVS 1999 EVS 2008
Different race 8.4% 17.2% 11.6%
Muslims – 23.7% 15.9%
Immigrants/foreign workers 6.8% 19.2% 12.1%
Homosexuals 45.5% 46.4% 48.1%
Jews – 15.8% 11%
Gypsies – 32.6% 22.8%
As seen here, the period between 1999 and 2008 reflects a significant increase 
in tolerance for all listed groups with the exception of homosexuals.8 Interestingly, 
the data shows a decrease in tolerance between 1995 and 1999 for two of the three 
groups for which we have data: people of a different race and immigrants/foreign 
workers. Although the latter could be explained by changing economic circum-
stances, especially if immigrants are perceived as taking jobs from Croatian work-
ers, it is likely that the nationalist policies and rhetoric of the Tuđman era and the 
8 With 87.8% of the population declaring themselves as Catholic in the 2001 census, Croatia 
retains a strongly Catholic identity and the corresponding set of values on matters such as ho-
mosexuality and abortion. Homophobia remains a problem today, with 45.5% of high school 
students surveyed in April/May 2010 by GONG agreeing with the statement: “Homosexuality is 
some kind of disease”.
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Homeland War actually increased intolerance in Croatian society. If that is the case, 
anti-liberalization changes of the 1990s to political culture have proved more endu-
ring than the tolerance of the Yugoslav era: in 2008, Croatia had still not returned to 
the levels of tolerance it exhibited in 1995. It is more difficult, it would appear, to 
break down intolerance than to induce it.
How have tolerance levels with regard to Serbs changed in the aftermath of 
the Homeland War? Demographically, Croatia is more homogeneous today (89.6% 
Croat, 4.5% Serb according to the 2001 census) than it was during Yugoslav times, 
limiting the amount of tolerance-producing interaction. Data collected by Gallup 
Balkans Monitor provides us with some insight on the matter through its section 
on relations with neighbors, in which participants were asked whether Serbia was 
friendly, neutral or hostile to Croatia. Though the question refers to relations with 
the state of Serbia rather than tolerance of Serbs, tolerance is obstructed when a 
group is perceived as a threat. So long as a sizable portion of the Croatian popula-
tion perceives Serbia as a threat, intolerance of Serbs will remain high. In 2006, over 
half (53.3%) of respondents categorized Serbia as hostile. That number jumped to 
62.2% in 2008, but fell in 2010 to 45.4%. Although the number shows signs of de-
cline in the most recent survey, it appears that, a full 15 years after the cessation 
of military hostilities, intolerance of Serbs endures. This is further supported by 
national reactions to the Hague’s sentencing of Croatian General Ante Gotovina 
in April 2011. Though public protests were nonviolent and limited in number, the 
media and government alike reacted in shock, interpreting Gotovina’s guilty ver-
dict as condemnation of Operation Storm and Croatian statehood. Croatian expat 
and Washington Times columnist Jeffrey Kuhner wrote that the verdict was equiva-
lent to the assertion that “all sides were guilty of atrocities; no party – or nation – 
was more responsible than the other. This is what Serbia has been demanding for 
years. It has sought to cover its genocidal culpability and national shame with moral 
equivalence” (Kuhner, 2011). Though Kuhner’s extremist views should hardly be 
attributed to the Croatian people as a whole, his words here unfortunately reflect the 
opinions of too many normally moderate Croats. The reaction to Gotovina’s verdict 
is evidence that intolerance towards Serbs resulting from the Homeland War has 
not yet been overcome. The relative tolerance of the Yugoslav era proved, unfortu-
nately, insufficiently resilient, while the intolerance generated by the events of the 
1990s is more slowly swept aside.
Next we will turn out attention to levels of interpersonal trust. While liberal 
democracy does not require trust in government (on the contrary, a certain amount 
of distrust is probably healthy), it does require trust in one’s fellow citizens, a sense 
that ‘we are all in this together’ rather than ‘every man for himself’. Data speaking 
to levels of interpersonal trust presents a mixed picture. According to the Gallup 
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Balkans Monitor poll, 66.4% of respondents in 2006 stated that they trusted peo-
ple in general “a lot” or “some.” This number climbed to 73.3% in 2008, and held 
steady at 74% in 2010. Trust for people of different ethnicities remains lower, but is 
also showing a general upward trend (46% in 2006, 57.7% in 2008, 53% in 2010).
Data collected by WVS and EVS, however, presents a different story. In 1995, 
only 22.2% agreed with the statement “Most people can be trusted”. That number 
held steady in 1999 at 19.8%, and in 2008 at 19%. This data certainly falls on the 
low end of the countries surveyed by WVS, putting Croatia in the company of fel-
low post-Yugoslav nations Slovenia (15.3%) and Serbia (18.1%), as well as France 
(18.8%). The Scandinavian countries displayed some of the highest levels of inter-
personal trust (Norway, with 74.2%, was the highest), while most Western demo-
cracies had scores around 50% (US 39.3%, Germany 36.8%, Switzerland 53.9%, 
New Zealand 51.2%). What can be said of this data is that we are wrong to as-
sume that self-expression values are at healthy levels within historical democracies. 
Though Croatia appears, comparatively, to exhibit low levels of interpersonal trust, 
the stark divergence between Gallup’s data and that of WVS/EVS makes it impossi-
ble to draw conclusions about the development of interpersonal trust in transitional 
Croatia.
Lastly, we consider changes to participatory habits in the post-Yugoslav era. 
Participatory habits can be divided into those that are distinctly political (such 
as participation in protests, etc.) and those of a less political nature, described by 
Putnam in his oft-cited book Bowling Alone, that build habits of association crucial 
for democracy (book clubs, church groups, sporting leagues, etcetera). As discussed 
in the previous section, the Yugoslav system cultivated participatory habits along 
socio-economic lines. Thus, the primary question for the post-Yugoslav era will be 
whether participatory habits – of either the political or non-political type – have 
spread to other sectors of society.
EVS is structured to ask participants whether they belong to a number of or-
ganizations ranging from religious organizations, professional associations, envi-
ronmental groups and sports/recreation groups, amongst others. For both the 1999 
and 2008 surveys, numbers for specific genres of groups remain low, without any 
discernible trends either upward or downward. Rather than looking at membership 
for specific genres of groups, however, the number of greatest interest to us is the 
percentage of those who explicitly state that they belong to no group. After being 
asked about their membership to a variety of types of groups, participants were 
asked whether they belong to ‘another group’, that is, one that had not been includ-
ed in any of the previously mentioned categories. The surveyors did not specifi-
cally ask whether they did not belong to any groups; the information was provided 
voluntarily by participants. Therefore, it is likely that this number is understated, as 
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some may have simply stated that they did not belong to any other group without 
further elaboration. In 1999, 56.9% stated that they belonged to no group. In 2008, 
that number dropped to 34.7%. Even accounting for the fact that the numbers are 
likely understated, the drop of 22.2% is indicative of an upswing in non-political 
participatory habits between 1999 and 2008.
It must be acknowledged that a survey by the Zagreb-based NGO GONG 
presents something of a conflicting picture. Surveying high school aged students 
(the majority of survey respondents were born in 1991 and 1992, and thus educated 
in transitional Croatia) in April/May 2010, the survey asked, “Are you personally 
a member of an association of citizens, such as youth organizations, humanitarian 
organizations, human rights organizations, amateur sports, or singing clubs and the 
like?” 61.9% answered in the negative. 
This data presents a somewhat bleak picture of the future of Croatian civil soci-
ety, with the majority of its youth – those most likely to possess self-expression va-
lues on the basis that they were educated under an institutionally democratic system 
– lacking the personal stake in society that comes from participation in such organi-
zations. Encouragingly, GONG has attempted to remedy this deficiency on a small 
scale by organizing short term projects for high school students that require partici-
pants to generate project proposals in teams, discuss, select and implement the best 
proposal. As GONG explains it, “the aim is to influence a change of the negative 
attitude that young people generally express towards politics, and give them an op-
portunity to take on responsibility for implementing and financing a certain set of 
measures on the local level” (GONG, 2010: 19). 
With regard to distinctly political participatory actions, WVS and EVS ask 
respondents whether they have, might, or would never engage in the following 
political activities: sign a petition, join a boycott, attend lawful demonstrations, 
participate in an unlawful strike, and occupy a building. As we might expect, the 
percentage of people who reportedly participated in these actions increased in each 
subsequent survey, although participation levels generally remain below those of 
historical Western democracies.
Interestingly, approval for these actions in Croatia (measured by those express-
ing willingness to participate in said actions) does not seem to increase with the 
amount of time spent living under a democratic regime. Between 1995 and 1999, an 
increasing number of people reported that they might sign a petition, join a boycott 
or attend a lawful demonstration, as seen in Table B below. Between 1999 and 2008, 
however, that number dropped, re-approaching the 1995 levels. These shifts in pub-
lic approval for political participatory actions likely reflect the contemporary po-
litical situation and perceived need for reform. In the late 1990s, when Croatia was 
suffering from international isolation, affronts to freedom of the press and speech, 
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and little prospect of change under President Tuđman, the public granted increased 
approval to whatever means necessary to bring about change. By 2008, Croatia’s 
internal political situation and international reputation had improved, and the ave-
rage Croat felt less compelled to intervene directly in political life. Accordingly, 
concern shifted away from preserving the fundamental democratic rights of the citi-
zen, which had seemed at risk during the Tuđman era, to bread and butter issues. 
When asked what should be Croatia’s top aims, the percentage of votes for freedom 
of speech as the first or second aim (of four options provided) fell by 9.8% between 
1999 and 2008. In contrast, the percentage of votes placing fighting the rise of pri-
ces amongst the top two aims increased by 13.2%.
Changes in approval for the more extreme actions mentioned, an unofficial 












Sign petition 40.2% 56.1% +15.9% 43.2% –12.9%
Join boycott 51.1% 56.7% +5.6% 47.8% –8.9%
Attend lawful demonstration 53.7% 64.9% +11.2% 54.8% –10.1%
Participate in unofficial strike 38.9% 38.5% -0.4% 40.7% +2.2%
Occupy building 16.7% 17.1% +.4% 15.1% -2.0%















Sign petition 15% 4.7% –10.3% 9.2% +4.5%
Join boycott 37.5% 28.8% –8.7% 33.3% +4.5%
Attend lawful demonstration 34.4% 22.9% –11.5% 28.5% +5.6%
Participate in unofficial strike 49.2% 48.1% –1.1% 44.3% -3.8%
Occupy building 74.2% 71.3% –2.9% 71.5% +0.2%
World Values Survey 1995, European Values Survey 1999, 2008
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This data suggests that while Croats became more involved in the participa-
tory social groups that Putnam deems as so crucial to democracy, their willingness 
to engage in political actions actually dropped in the first decade of the 21st century. 
In other words, they are engaging increasingly with society, but not with the politi-
cal sphere. This could well reflect a sense of alienation from politics, supported by 
the divergence between the government and their constituency on the issue of EU 
membership, possibly the foremost issue in Croatian politics at the time of writing. 
Despite 37% of the population reporting in November 2009 that EU membership 
would be a bad thing for Croatia, and 35% replying it would be neither good nor 
bad (Eurobarometer, 2010), the Croatian Times reported in November 2010 that not 
a single member of the Croatian Parliament was anti-EU, producing a citizenry un-
derstandably skeptical that their opinions matter to their governing bodies.9
There is no doubt that the three social features we have examined – tolerance, 
interpersonal trust and participatory habits – are highly interconnected. Tolerance 
and interpersonal trust are generated from interacting with other members of one’s 
community, often in the context of civil society organizations. As our data showed, 
participation in such organizations is on the rise, but remains limited compared to 
Western standards. Political participation, on the other hand, experienced a tempo-
rary surge in approval at the end of the 1990s, but has since declined. Tolerance has 
also fluctuated in the course of Croatia’s 20 years of independence. Data about in-
terpersonal trust is conflicting, although levels appear to be lower in Croatia than in 
most historical Western democracies. In short, the development of self-expression 
values in post-Yugoslav Croatia has been anything but linear.
Part 4: Driving Forces Behind Political Culture
What explains this non-linear development of self-expression values in transitional 
Croatia? Welzel and Inglehart point to economic development, specifically indus-
trialization, as the main explanatory factor in self-expression values. To what extent 
do the levels of economic development explain fluctuations in self-expression va-
lues in Croatia?
As previously mentioned, Croatia underwent industrialization (and subsequent 
urbanization) on a later time table than Western Europe. Therefore, we would ex-
pect self-expression values to surface in Croatia later than they did in European 
countries that underwent industrialization at an earlier date. But can we expect the 
degree of industrialization to predict differences in the preponderance of self-ex-
pression values? In other words, given that Croatia and Slovenia experienced a 
9 For more on this issue, see Štulhofer, Aleksandar, “Euroscepticism in Croatia: On the Far Side 
of Rationality?” <http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/View/?resid=6130>.
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greater degree of industrialization than the rest of Yugoslavia, would we expect 
these republics to display more tolerance, interpersonal trust and participatory ha-
bits? This has already been disproven, as Slovenia was shown to be one of Yugosla-
via’s more intolerant republics. Similarly, if self-expression values develop simulta-
neously with economic growth, will they diminish in times of economic decline? In 
some cases, perhaps: Hodson, Sekulic and Massey suggest that unemployment can 
foster intolerance, as people must compete for limited jobs. But it is unrealistic to 
expect that participatory habits, tolerance and interpersonal trust will increase and 
decrease with fluctuations of the economy. If that were the case, the world’s wealth-
iest nations would display the highest levels of self-expression values, a link we do 
not see evidence of. For the most part, a certain level of economic development is 
necessary to enable a society to move away from survival values and towards self-
-expression values. Once that tipping point has been passed, however, varying le-
vels of economic development cannot be used to explain differences in self-expres-
sion values across time and place. 
Yugoslavia certainly brought its constituent republics beyond that tipping point. 
Between 1948 and 1960, the Yugoslav economy enjoyed an average annual growth 
of GDP of 7.3%, with 10.2% in industry and 4.7% in agriculture (Maksimović, 
1965: 166). The percentage of the population employed in agriculture across the 
country dropped from 74.9% in 1938 to 50% in 1960 (Frease, 1975: 42). Although 
a significant socio-economic gap between Northern and Southern Yugoslavia per-
sisted, all republics enjoyed an increase in their standard of living (as measured by 
GDP per capita).
Though the Croatian economy experienced regression during the Homeland 
War and during the recent financial crisis (in 2009, the World Bank reported that 
GDP contracted by 5.8%), economic development did not regress to pre-industrial 
levels. If economic development cannot explain fluctuations in self-expression va-
lues, it seems that other factors are at work. Though self-expression values can de-
velop under any regime, it is possible that a democratic regime is more conducive 
to their development. Here we turn out attention to the democratization of Croatian 
institutions, while acknowledging that the drafting of a constitution featuring model 
democratic institutions does not necessary indicate that the country functions as a 
democracy. In other words, institutions alone do not make a democracy.
Though Croatia has operated under the same constitution since 1991 (with limi-
ted amendments), the actual degree of institutional democracy present in Croatia 
has varied a great deal. It is not by chance that the year 2000, the turning point for 
Croatian democracy, institutionally speaking, coincides roughly with the death of 
nationalistic President Tuđman. Former US ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zim-
mermann described “Tudjman [as being] obsessed by nationalism. His devotion to 
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Croatia is of the most narrow-minded sort, and he has never shown much under-
standing of or interest in democratic values” (Zimmerman, 1995: 7).
Given the executive centric government that characterized Croatia for the 
course of the 1990s with this man at the helm, it is little surprise that its institu-
tions regularly fell short of democratic norms. The privatization process was far 
from transparent, with many factories landing in the hands of Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ) supporters. The freedom of the press was restricted, as opposition 
newspapers and radio stations were forced to endure harassment and supervision 
by the state under the pretense of overseeing privatization. Judicial independence 
was threatened by the strong hand of the executive in appointing and removing 
judicial personnel (Cohen, 1997: 87). The rights of ethnic minorities, particularly 
the right of Serbs to return, was regularly called into question, as critics voiced 
concerns about post-war attempts to create an ethnically homogenous state. Writ-
ing on the eve of the 2000 parliamentary elections, Human Rights Watch assessed 
that:
Croatia faces an ongoing democracy deficit. Despite a vibrant civil society with 
very active nongovernmental organizations, improvements in security, and the re-
integration of Eastern Slavonia, many problems remain (...) Universal suffrage is 
weakened by the denial of citizenship and hence the right to vote to tens of thou-
sands of Croatian Serb refugees. Freedom of expression is curtailed, especially in 
the area of broadcast media, which remains under the tight control of the govern-
ment. The right to assemble is at the discretion of local authorities, despite rulings 
by the Constitutional Court that it is a fundamental freedom. Most disturbing, 
however, has been the politicization of new appointments to the Constitutional 
Court, with appointments made on the basis of political affiliation rather than 
merit. (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 2)
Despite the democratic deficit that characterized the regime, Tuđman’s achieve-
ments are not insignificant; writing in 1996, Lenard Cohen identified Croatia’s 
achievements as the elimination of a one-party regime, the beginning of economic 
reform, international recognition of Croatian statehood, and the conduct of com-
petitive elections (Cohen, 1997: 69). The World Bank’s Global Governance Indica-
tors find that the second half of the decade was characterized by a notable increase 
in law and order and government efficiency, and a decrease in corruption. Conse-
quently, the legacy of Tuđman as the ‘father of Croatia’ persists domestically, de-
spite speculation from parts of the international community that, had he not died 
when he did, Tuđman would likely have shared quarters with notorious Serbian 
leader Slobodan Milošević at the Hague. As the US-based Slate magazine wrote on 
the eve of Tuđman’s death, “history will remember him more accurately: ‘Franjo 
Tudjman: Not Quite as Bad as Milosevic’” (Plotz, 1999).
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The death of Tuđman in December 1999, combined with general dissatisfac-
tion and economic concerns in particular, prompted the Croatian voters to elect to 
power a center-left coalition headed by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), mar-
king the first transition of power in the short history of independent Croatia. Though 
confronted with the “monumental task of dealing with the legacy of ethno-natio-
nalist mobilization, violent conflict, authoritarian governance and the penetration of 
state institutions by organized crime” (Jović, 2010: 1616), the coalition government 
managed to set Croatia decisively on a new path. In the realm of foreign policy, the 
coalition ended the international isolation that had characterized the second half of 
the 1990s by declaring intent to orient itself away from the Balkans and towards 
European integration. Reforms followed, including increased (if not total) coopera-
tion with the ICTY, a shift from supra-presidential to parliamentary system, and de-
centralization. Civil society and independent media grew under the environment of 
freedom, but anti-Serb policies continued in many cases due to the refusal of local 
governments to comply with the central government’s policy. The reforms were met 
with approval by the international community: Croatia was rewarded with WTO 
membership in November 2000, and candidate status to the EU in 2003.
Again voting on bread and butter issues, the populace voted a reformed HDZ 
back into power in 2004. Democratic progress continued steadily under the new 
presidential administration and Croatia received NATO membership in 2009. Since 
receiving candidate status in 2003, Croatia has made steady progress towards com-
pleting the chapters required for EU membership, and is expected to achieve full 
membership on July 1st, 2013. Under Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor (2009-2011), 
Croatia has made a highly public effort to crack down on the high level corruption 
that the EU has identified as an enduring problem, most notably with the arrest of 
former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader.
The maturation of Croatian institutional, or electoral, democracy over the past 
two decades is clearly reflected by various indexes that measure democracy on the 
state level. We will briefly look at two of these in order to assess the strength of 
democratic institutions as an explanatory factor of self-expression values: Freedom 
House’s Freedom in the World Survey and The World Bank’s Good Governance 
Indicators.
Freedom House’s well-known Freedom in the World Survey features a more 
limited degree of gradation, as countries are categorized as free, partially free or not 
free, based on the degree of political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by individu-
als within a country. From 1991 to 2000, Croatia was categorized as “partially free”. 
2001 marked the first year that Croatia was categorized as a “free” state, a categori-
zation it has retained every year since (through 2011). Its scores for political rights 
and civil liberties (in which 1 represents the most free and 7 represents the least 
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free) dropped accordingly at the turn of the 21st century.10 Although Freedom House 
explicitly states that it does not assess government performance (since factors such 
as non-state actors and armed conflict can impact the degree of freedom experience 
by individuals), it seems reasonable to assume that the timing of Croatia’s transi-
tion from partially free to free is indicative of an increasing commitment to politi-
cal rights and civil liberties on the part of the coalition government. Had Croatia’s 
transition from partially free to free country occurred in 1995, when the violence 
associated with the Homeland War subsided, it would have been logical to attribute 
the shift in classification to the cessation of war rather than to institutional reforms. 
That the timing coincides with Croatia’s electoral ousting of HDZ from power, 
however, indicates that government institutions underwent the democratic reforms 
that had been delayed for a decade by the Tuđman regime.
The World Bank’s Good Governance Indicators provide us with detailed as-
sessments of Croatia’s governmental institutions. Data is presented by ranking the 
country amongst all the countries in the world in such a way that 0 is the lowest 
possible ranking, and 100 is the highest. As with the data gathered by Transparency 
International and Freedom House, we see that the year 2000 marks a turning point 
for Croatia in the category of Voice and Accountability, defined as “perceptions of 
the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their go-
vernment, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media” 
(Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010: 4). A significant upswing occurred between 
1998 and 2000 (from 40.1% to 61.1%). This reinforces the findings of Freedom 
House that change Croatia’s categorization from partially free to free in the same pe-
riod. Rankings for Voice and Accountability between 2000 and 2009 have remained 
consistently in the low-mid 60 percentile range.11 Based on the preceding summary of 
developments in Croatia’s institutional democracy, we can safely speculate that this 
upswing is attributable to the democratizing reforms of the SDP-led coalition.
To review the trends in levels of institutional democracy and self-expression 
values: in the second half of the 1990s, civil liberties, including freedom of speech, 
assembly and the press, and minority rights were restricted. In the category of self-
-expression values, tolerance decreased, while approval for political participatory 
behavior, in the form of petitions, boycotts and demonstrations, increased. In the 
10 Croatia’s full Freedom House scores are as follows, formatted as Year (political rights score, 
civil liberties score): 1991-1992 (3, 4) 1992-1993 (4, 4), 1993-1994 (4, 4), 1994-1995 (4, 4), 
1995-1996 (4, 4), 1996-1997 (4, 4), 1997-1998 (4, 4), 1998-1999 (4, 4), 1999-2000 (4, 4), 2000-
-2001 (2, 3), 2002 (2, 2), 2003 (2, 2), 2004 (2, 2), 2005 (2, 2), 2006 (2, 2), 2007 (2, 2), 2008 (2, 
2), 2009 (2, 2), 2010 (1, 2).
11 The year 2004 represents something of an anomaly at 71.6%. In the subsequent year, the rank-
ing dropped back down to 63.9%.
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post-Tuđman period, the government increasingly shifted its focus from state-build-
ing to democracy building, and political rights and civil liberties increased. In the 
category of self-expression values, tolerance increased, but approval for political 
participatory behavior decreased during this period. Levels of interpersonal trust 
have remained low as compared to the global democratic average.
From this we can conclude that the correlation between the democratization of 
institutions and the liberalization of political culture is minimal. In Croatia, partici-
patory habits surged in a nationalist regime lacking democratic institutions, yet de-
clined under more democratic institutions. Institutions alone, it appears, cannot pre-
vent nor sustain participatory habits. Even in the case of tolerance, where a rough 
correlation exists, other factors, such as level of diversity and perceptions of threat, 
might better explain fluctuations.
The implication, then, is that it is very much possible to have an electoral de-
mocracy without a liberal democracy, though the sustainability of this arrangement 
is dubious. The building of democratic institutions is not a guarantee that self-ex-
pression values with follow. If they do, it will be the result of other factors, such as 
diversity and civil engagement. Identifying and harnessing these factors is, there-
fore, of the utmost importance for transitional nations.
Part 5: Implications Beyond the Region
The varying transitional paths taken by Croatia, the other countries of the former 
Yugoslavia and the USSR have been a learning experience not only for the coun-
tries themselves, but also for the democracy builders of the world, both governmen-
Table D. Voice and Accountability (2009) – Croatia
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tal and NGO. Democracy is about the habits of the heart as much (if not more so) as 
it is about elections and institutions. Encouragingly, the US has recently been mak-
ing an effort to broaden its definition of democracy. With the post-Mubarak Egypt 
only days old and protests raging in Libya and Bahrain, US Secretary of State Hil-
lary Clinton said in February 2011, “we recognize there are many paths to demo-
cracy, and we recognize that true and sustainable democracy is about far more than 
elections” (Clinton, 2011).
Elusive though a succinct definition for political culture remains, there are few 
who question its value in the establishment of a liberal democracy. This paper has 
attempted to shed light on the development of three self-expression values that, 
based on the cross-country comparisons of the World Values Survey, have a direct 
correlation to levels of liberal democracy. In so doing, it has found that the develop-
ment of these values does not necessarily correspond chronologically to the build-
ing of democratic institutions; in the case of Croatia, approval for political partici-
pation surged in the decade predating institutional reforms. Its recent decline at a 
time when Croatia’s degree of institutional democracy has been on the rise suggests 
that democratic institutions alone cannot necessarily sustain levels of political par-
ticipation. Thus, while institutional reform and the conduct of free and fair elections 
are of fundamental importance in establishing electoral democracy, measures to 
bolster the public’s participatory habits, interpersonal trust and tolerance – requisite 
for ensuring a liberal democracy – must come separately.
The idea of building democracy where self-expression values are not preexist-
ing admittedly removes what Welzel and Inglehart see as the impetus for democra-
cy. The notion of developing the two simultaneously thus presents a challenge. For 
countries – such as Afghanistan – that have not yet reached the level of economic 
development that enables them to abandon survival values, the first step will come 
in economic development that filters down to all levels of the population. Many of 
the Middle Eastern nations recently swept up in the Arab Spring suffer from a re-
source curse and a resulting wealth gap of huge proportions: reforms should center 
on sharing out the nation’s oil wealth or developing job-providing industries sepa-
rate of the oil industry. Countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, although they have 
reached the precipice of democratization not by popular revolt but by the involve-
ment of foreign powers, are in this sense no different. 
For the countries that have passed the survival values economic threshold, the 
relearning of political culture will fall largely to NGO (and perhaps government) 
programs aimed at building the citizens’ democratic competency. Croatia’s experi-
ence shows us that relearning is possible: though the role of historical political cul-
ture cannot be dismissed in shaping modern political culture, participatory habits, 
tolerance and interpersonal trust are subject to various contemporary forces as evi-
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dent by their fluctuation. Through educational workshops and materials, contests, 
international exchanges, research and publications, NGO and government programs 
can promote self-expression values within the transitional society and collect valua-
ble data upon which to assess progress and shape future programs. A prime example 
of such an organization is GONG, the previously mentioned Zagreb-based civil so-
ciety organization. Along with ensuring government transparency and accountabil-
ity through election monitoring, GONG promotes civic activism through an annual 
award for Citizens’ Activism and Democracy Development that highlights positive 
examples in Croatian society. They also organize educational workshops, covering 
such topics as the electoral and democratic process. Since 2006, GONG has run a 
‘European Class’, designed to encourage “young people to make objective conclu-
sions on the European Union and reduce prejudices they might have as a result of 
having insufficient partial information on the Croatian membership in the Euro-
pean Union” (GONG, 2010: 18). Through 4 years of workshops for students and 
seminars for teachers, nearly 40,000 high school students have participated in this 
program.
The appropriate role for the international community in the relearning of po-
litical culture is somewhat debatable. On the one hand, the involvement of such or-
ganizations as the Open Society Institute and the National Democratic Institute are 
necessary for the development of NGOs in transitional societies, providing know-
ledge transfer, financial backing, and personnel training. Increasingly, NGOs are 
not the only ones assuming this role: in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US State Depart-
ment, US military, and the United Nations have assumed this position in various ca-
pacities. In the long run, both international NGOs and governments tend to fall into 
the same trap: prematurely declaring mission accomplished and pulling funding 
when significant work remains, potentially to the detriment of local organizations 
that have developed a dependence on their foreign partners. While international 
organizations are instrumental in the inaugural phase, emphasis should be placed 
early on making NGOs as independent (both in terms of personnel and finances) as 
possible, gradually transitioning the foreign partner to an advisory role. 
A related key take away is the importance of establishing a thorough under-
standing of a nation’s historical and current political culture before undertaking 
its liberalization. As the world contemplates what democracy in the Middle East 
might look like, foreign governments and those employed in international develop-
ment would do well to remember that the starting point of political culture in Egypt 
is as different from that of Libya as political culture in post-Yugoslav Croatia was 
from that of post-Soviet Russia. Just as the legacy of political culture in Croatia 
was shaped by the unique self-management structure of Yugoslavia and the ethnic 
antagonism aggregated by the Homeland War, so too does each Middle Eastern 
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country have a set of historical legacies that have combined to produce a unique 
political culture. It is this political culture that must be reformed to sustain a liberal 
democracy, not a generic one mistakenly applied to the region as a whole. Tempting 
though it is to bring in regional or subject experts to devise programs that system-
atically reform civil society, what is truly needed are country experts – likely from 
within the transitional country itself – with a deep understanding of national history, 
particularly as it pertains to the self-expression values examined here: participatory 
habits, interpersonal trust and tolerance.
When we speak of political culture, we sometimes make the mistake of con-
fining our remarks to democracies. But democracies are not the only countries to 
have political culture; the presence of intolerance, political apathy and interpersonal 
distrust shape a nation’s political culture as much as their opposites. What should 
give us hope though, as we contemplate the future of distinctly non-liberal political 
cultures, is that they can and do change, as seen in Croatia. The pace of change may 
be slow, uneven and even relapse at times, but as Head of the Delegation of the Eu-
ropean Commission said at the time of Croatia’s accession, “the Croatian example 
shows that geography is a fact but not destiny” (Koschmieder, 2001: 149). Further 
research into the driving forces behind change in the self-expression values is ne-
cessary so that NGOs and policymakers, both domestic and foreign, can effective-
ly harness these forces to deliberately cultivate participatory habits, interpersonal 
trust and tolerance, ultimately leading towards the emergence of a democratically 
component citizenry. Conveniently, recent history provides us with an abundance 
of historical examples to study, and values-based surveys provide us with the tools 
to do so.
Part 6: Conclusion
Interestingly, democracy promotion, as seen through the Western response to the 
Arab Spring, has come full circle. In contrast to their enthusiastic embrace of the 
Eastern European revolutions and optimistic predictions of coming democracy, the 
West, in particular the US, has shown itself as reluctant to commit resources to 
support the new regimes in Egypt or Tunisia, or to give more than verbal support 
to the revolutionaries in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. The sense of ambiguity about 
where these new regimes are headed is reminiscent of the tone that characterized 
the response to the overthrow of authoritarianism in South America and Southern 
Europe. After the euphoria of the first few weeks wore off, concerns that the Arab 
Spring revolutions would give rise to Islamist governments have been cause for the 
West to proceed with caution. The influx of Western capital, businessmen and aid 
that characterized the first years after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe is 
noticeably absent. 
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Part of this is attributable, no doubt, to the fact that the economic situation of 
the world’s democracy club today is not what it was 20 years ago. Another fac-
tor is the lessons learned: although some success stories did come out of Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe, there have been serious disappointments as well: Rus-
sia, Georgia and Belarus, to name a few. The triumph of the Western idea that had 
seemed so certain in 1989 seems less of a sure thing in a world where a small group 
of individuals can wreak havoc on the West and people burn American flags in pub-
lic squares.
Perhaps what we are witnessing is the beginning of the US retreat from an ac-
tive role in democracy building. If so, that is an unfortunate turn of events for the 
world. The US does not seem to doubt that more democracies in the world is in 
its national interest; what it seems less certain of, in light of the many pseudo-de-
mocracies that emerged in Eastern Europe and pockets of anti-American sentiment 
around the world, is whether the activities known as democracy building can yield 
any fruit in this setting.
Democracy building is undoubtedly complex, and it frustratingly resists a for-
mula. But it is not in vain. Our study of the Croatian example shows that political 
culture is adaptable. Though the specific factors that explain its fluctuations require 
further research, what is clear is that future political culture need not be predeter-
mined by historical political culture. An intolerant, distrustful society lacking par-
ticipatory habits is not condemned to remain that way. At the same time, we must 
not expect a political culture to spring from newly built democratic institutions. 
Nor should we neglect political culture, focusing exclusively on elections and in-
stitutions. Standing up new institutions and a capitalist system is only the first step; 
reforming the political culture is necessary to advance from an electoral to liberal 
democracy. 
Even should the West refrain from taking an active role in democracy building 
in the nations affected by the Arab Spring, democracy in the region is not neces-
sarily doomed. Those with the greatest stake in a nation’s future are, after all, the 
citizens of that nation. Should self-expression values – the impulse behind demo-
cracy – be present in these nations, the prospects for democracy are bright with or 
without the involvement of the West. Should self-expression values not be present 
at the time of revolution, they might yet emerge, whether by deliberate programs or 
by a change in national diversity, increased interaction with fellow citizens in a new 
atmosphere of freedom or a perceived sense of national possibility. 
Upon Croatia’s entrance in the Partnership for Peace program, the Secretary 
General of NATO stated that “Croatia is proof that a country does not have to remain 
a victim of history” (Jović, 2006: 15). There was a time when the world could not 
have imagined a peaceful Germany that would be the economic backbone of Europe. 
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There was a time when the world could not have imagined a Warsaw Pact country 
holding the EU presidency. Now is a time when the world seriously doubts the pos-
sibility of a democratic Middle East or a democratic Afghanistan. And the world may 
be right. As the track record in Eastern and Southeastern Europe shows, not every ef-
fort in history is a success story. But the prospect alone is reason enough to try.
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